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At the same time as, in Paris, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl experimented with the concept of 
“participation,” in Harvard, William James undertook a parallel trajectory by taking recourse to 
the notion of “the vague.” For him, vagueness described the fact that reality is richer than any 
and all conceptualizations.  In light of the ethnographic material provided by contemporary 
developments in ethnography, this paper mobilizes James’ concept of the vague by reference to 
Lévy-Bruhl’s participation in order to develop instruments for capturing ethnographically the 
complexities of entanglement and emergence in human sociality.  The paper concludes that 
indeterminacy and underdetermination are doors of entanglement as they both limit and make 
possible the constitution of entities in sociality. 
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Every species is vague, every term goes cloudy at its edges, and so in 
my way of thinking, relentless logic is only another name for 
stupidity—for a sort of intellectual pig-headedness.  
(H.G. Wells 1904: 386) 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, in Paris, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl was experimenting with the 
concept of “participation” in order to respond to the challenges posed to received neo-Kantian 
wisdom by the ethnographic evidence that was then emerging concerning how people behaved 
in pre-modern societies (see Pina-Cabral 2018a).  At much the same time, in Harvard, as he 
developed the philosophical underpinnings of his psychology, William James was undertaking a 
parallel trajectory by taking recourse to the notion of “the vague.” For him, vagueness described 
the fact that reality is richer than any and all conceptualizations (see Gavin 1992: 178).  In light 
of the ethnographic material that is being provided by contemporary developments in 
ethnography (e.g. Lovell 2006 or Sanabria 2016), this paper mobilizes James’ concept of the vague 
by reference to Lévy-Bruhl’s participation in order to develop instruments for capturing 
ethnographically the complexities of entanglement and emergence as enduring features of human 
sociality. 
In the philosophy of logic, ‘vague’ is a technical concept with a very specific definition 
(e.g. Williamson 1994, Egré 2019).  Here, however, we will depend on the way James defined it 
(see Gavin 1992: 29).  By calling for an embrace of the vague, he was advocating an approach to 
the study of human sociality where ontological transgression (ambivalence, ambiguity, 
participation, equivocation, fuzziness, gradualism) was not taken to be an enemy of thought, but 
on the contrary, its very condition of possibility (see Palmié 2018).  Thus, this paper argues that 
participation and vagueness are valuable tools of ethnographic theory on condition that they are 
seen as correlate.  In adapting the insights of these authors from a century ago to our present 
theoretical and empirical challenges, we mean to liberate them from the background assumptions 
that cast an aporic shadow over both Lévy-Bruhl’s “mystical participation” and James’ 
“ontological wonder-sickness” (Gavin 1992: 12) and that manifested themselves in the analytical 
dead-end represented by the work on vagueness by a long line of social researchers, from Schütz 
(1943) to Garfinkel (1967) and, more recently, Green (2019). 
 Rationality as aporia 
For both James and Lévy-Bruhl, the evidence for which they were finding space by means of the 
concepts of vagueness and participation, respectively, posed itself as a challenge to rationality in 
face of the modern, supposedly scientific, outlook on the world.  Lévy-Bruhl ([1910] 1951) 
insisted on the “mystical” nature of “primitive thought”. But, contrary to what many of his 
critics seem to think, this did not mean he thought “primitives” to be irrational.  In their 
individual capacity, he acknowledged, these people were bound by rationality as much as anyone 
else:  
As an individual, to the extent that he thinks and acts independently of his collective 
representations—so far as that is possible—a primitive man will feel, consider, and act most 
often in the way we would expect him to. The inferences that he will make will be precisely those 
that would seem reasonable to us under the same circumstances. (ibid.: 79, my translation)  
The thought of “primitives”, however, seemed to be bound by attachments to their 
collective belongings that prevented them from being free to engage in logical thinking, as 
modern scientists were meant to do.  It is only in 1938, at the end of his long life (see 1998), that 
Lévy-Bruhl finally finds a path towards reconciling the ethnographic evidence of participation 
with the universal human condition. Participation, after all, turned out to be present in all human 
beings as it was a founding condition for becoming a person. 
In turn, William James is quite explicit about the aporic nature of his struggle with 
“vagueness” as a general feature of humans in the world (1905[1879/1882]: 63-110): “Existence 
then will be a brute fact to which as a whole the emotion of ontological wonder shall rightfully 
cleave, but remain eternally unsatisfied.” (ibid.: 75) Ultimately, what was at stake in both cases 
was the surprising discovery that, although in our daily lives we are rational, in that we aim to fit 
means to ends, Reason has clear limits in human life. 
 In his writings, the American pragmatist philosopher repeatedly called for “the re-
instatement of the vague and inarticulate to its proper place in our mental life” (1892: 165).  In 
fact, James’ insistence on the theme was not at all limited to a comment on the formal nature of 
social categories; it carried broader ontological implications.  He was pointing to a condition of 
incompleteness in all human experience. Indeed, in his study of the American philosopher’s 
lifelong fascination with the theme, William J. Gavin points out that James “is arguing against 
certainty, that is, against the usurping of the privileged position of center stage once and for all 
by any formulation of the universe.” (Gavin 1992: 2)  As the American philosopher put it, “an 
analysis of the world may yield a number of formulae, all consistent with the facts.” (James 1905: 
76) In other words, for James, the question has two aspects because not only is inarticulateness 
an inescapable condition of human concepts, but vagueness is a feature of the very world: 
“wonderfulness or mysteriousness will be an essential attribute of the nature of things, and the 
exhibition and emphasising of it will continue to be an ingredient in the philosophic industry of 
the race.” (1905: 75, my emphasis)  
Therefore, to phrase it in a more contemporary language, we can take James to be 
arguing that the permeability of entities implies that metaphysical pluralism is an unavoidable 
condition of life (for a development of the latter concept, see Pina-Cabral 2017: 135-180).  Note 
that we are not using metaphysical pluralism here as equivalent to what has been called 
“ontological pluralism”—which would imply a plurality of worlds.1  We use it more in line with 
what Brian Epstein in his survey of the debates on divination calls “moderate pragmatic 
pluralism” (2010: 1077).  The pluralism in question is “metaphysical” to the extent that it allows 
for seeing the world as creation—for a reflexive posture before the world—and it is “pluralist” 
not because there are different worlds but because no world is ever complete and closed onto 
itself. 
 In line with such a posture, Lévy-Bruhl too remains puzzled by a sense that his account 
of participation cannot, after all, be limited to an error of thinking by a particular group of 
people, since it applies to the world more generally.  His more direct confrontation with 
metaphysical pluralism is moved by an article published in Paris by Einstein that suggests to him 
that the problem goes beyond a mere issue of distinct formes mentales:  
Compared to the rational world of our sciences, the mythical world is not intelligible, it is 
imaginary, it cannot be real: how come then, although it is irrational (riddled with impossibilities 
and absurdities), primitive mentality takes it seriously as real?  Yet, at the same time that we 
search for an answer to this question, [Einstein inspires us to believe that] the intelligibility of the 
rational world is itself unintelligible.  Could it just be a matter of degree—a transfer of the 
unintelligibility of the part to the unintelligibility of the world as a whole? (1998 [July 1938]: 48, 
my translation) 
If looked at in terms of the metaphysics they imply, the two authors’ attitudes differ not 
in substance but in a matter of perspective.  James’ concern with pragmatism (“futuricity”, as he 
sometimes calls it) means that his concept of vagueness favours the coming-to-be angle of 
 
1 The idea of metaphysical pluralism only partly overlaps with that of “pluriverse” such as, for example, Mario 
Blaser and Marisol de la Cadena propose: “heterogeneous worldings coming together as a political ecology of 
practices, negotiating their difficult being together in heterogeneity.” (2018: 4) The idea of metaphysical pluralism is 
not to be parsed into separate “ontologies” since it applies to emergence and entanglement in general. 
approach: human action based on intentions, he claims, will ever remain vague.  By contrast, 
Lévy-Bruhl’s insistence on primitiveness as elementariness favours the angle of “having-become” 
in the sense that he focuses on the conditions which lead to a person’s incapacity to free 
themselves from attachments. Lévy-Bruhl’s “participation”, therefore, must be seen as reflected 
in James’ “vagueness”, and vice versa.   
For the French philosopher, in 1939, at the end of his life, participation had come to 
represent the ambivalent encounter between the singular and the plural in the formation of the 
person in the world (see Pina-Cabral 2018a: 436), an aspect that the American philosopher 
covers explicitly by his call for vagueness. Both authors were struggling with a theme that was 
going to be central to debates in the social sciences throughout the twentieth century: the 
question of rationality.  Both participation and vagueness challenged accepted Cartesian notions of 
rationality and reasonable behaviour.  In anthropology, at mid-century, the aporias surrounding 
witchcraft as a mode of participation became definitional of the discipline.  The locus classicus of 
this discussion is of course Evans-Pritchard’s account of Azande witchcraft (1976 [1937]), which 
was directly inspired by Lévy-Bruhl (1970 [1934]).  In sociology, too, the debates concerning 
rationality and James’s radical denial of it played a very similar role.  They never really stopped to 
this day, as will now be demonstrated.  
 
Atomistic minds2 
Inevitably, as has been the case with Lévy-Bruhl’s concept of participation (e.g. Sahlins 2011a 
and 2011b), we have also recently witnessed a re-emergence of discussions bringing to life again 
James’ concern with vagueness.  For example, in discussing how to account for the role of 
‘atmosphere’ in ethnographic writing, Mikkel Bille develops a sophisticated methodological 
critique of the proneness to stress the clarity of our respondents’ understanding of things and 
concepts.  He argues that, not only are objects dependent on their context, but they are not the 
same from different perspectives.  Undecidedness, he stresses, is a constant of everyday 
encounters.  Inspired by Edwin Ardener, Bille speaks of how the social encounters that 
ethnography describes correspond to “synchronisms of meaning, action and object” (2015: 265, 
Ardener 1992 and 2007). Arguing in favour of taking vagueness seriously as an aspect of 
sociality, he stresses the need to focus on the “in-betweeness beyond the collapse of 
representation-presentation dichotomies.” (ibid.: 269)   
 
2 Atomism is here defined, following on Karen Barad’s suggestion, as “an entire tradition in the history of Western 
metaphysics: the belief that the world is populated with individual things with their own independent sets of 
determinate properties.” (Barad 2007: 19) 
 Similarly, in a recent article, Bryan S. Green—a sociology professor at the University of 
York—argues that “sociology’s subject-matter, the social, is ontologically rooted in an essential 
ambiguity between abstraction and individuation” (2019: 109) and that it is, therefore, essential 
to find ways of preserving “the essential ambiguity of the social rather than having the effect of 
negating, dispelling, distorting, misreading, or mistaking it.” (2019: 125). In his paper, Green 
traces how this is a long-term problem in sociological theory.  Behind Durkheim’s collectivist 
account of the emergence of the social, he claims, as much as behind Simmel’s individualist 
account, lays the challenge of irresoluble ambiguity.   
Unfortunately, in line with his inspiration in the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Green stops 
the argument at the “ambiguity between abstraction and individuation”.  Yet, in order to account 
for ‘knowledge’ we have to grasp the nature of the knower; to address the nature of the entities 
that produce the ambiguity. In his argument, Green is unwittingly validating an approach to 
social life that remains rooted in a mentalist account—one that assumes a mind/matter polarity.  
Such an approach ultimately fails to question the nature of the subject, implicitly validating the 
Parsonian individualist cosmology that has been dominant in the social sciences since the end of 
the Second World War. 
As it happens, this truncated understanding of James’ argument has a long history that 
goes back to the immediate post-War period. Shortly after he arrived in the United States in 
1939, Alfred Schütz published an article where he attempted to follow up Max Weber’s 
epistemological suggestions concerning “ideal types” by integrating them with William James’ 
critique of rationality.  Called “The Problem of Rationality in the Social World” (1943: 130-149), 
this essay has become justly famous.  Its main argument may be summarised by the following 
sentence: “Our knowledge remains incoherent, our propositions occasional, our future 
uncertain, our general situation unstable.” (ibid.: 144)   
In those days, Talcott Parsons was the great gatekeeper, playing a similar role in the USA 
to that which Durkheim had played in France fifty years earlier.  As a recent refugee from 
Vienna, Schütz felt obliged to start by acknowledging the big man’s presence; his paper, 
therefore, starts from a quote of Parsons, where the latter declares his positivist theory of 
rationality: “Action is rational in so far as it pursues ends possible within the conditions of the 
situation, and by the means which, among those available to the actor, are intrinsically best 
adapted to the end for reasons understandable and verifiable by positive empirical science.” (in 
Schütz 1943: 130, my emphasis)  But then, curiously, Schütz’ essay evolves into a rather 
thorough critique of Parsonian positivism.  His inspiration in James makes sense as, fifty years 
earlier, the latter’s argument had been meant as a vivid challenge of the kind of positivist 
assumptions that Parsons was going to personify at mid-century.   
James had argued that, because “none of our explanations are complete” (1905: 67), 
“rationality [means] only unimpeded mental function.” (ibid.: 75) Thus, he did not see rationality 
as a positive quality, but rather as a feeling (a sentiment) of intellectual accommodation.  
Whenever we hope to think of “an absolute datum” (ibid.: 71), James argued, the idea of a non-
entity necessarily imposes itself.  Therefore, “Absolute existence is absolute mystery, for its 
relations with the nothing remain unmediated to our understanding.” (ibid.: 72). What this means 
is that, for James, the very ground of being is always left uncertain: we will never be able to 
eradicate “ontological wonder.”  Contrary to Parsons, therefore, he concludes that rationality 
(scientific or otherwise) can never consist of anything but “a feeling of familiarity” (1905: 77), a 
kind of fuzzy adjustment to the world as it presents itself to experience.   
Schütz’s paper starts from a notion of experience that he gathers from Husserl.  He 
contrasts different “levels” of experience: namely, “the theoretical level” versus “other levels of 
our experience of the social world” (1943: 131).  His choice of the term “level” for what we 
might call “modes” or “aspects” remains surprising for so long we fail to understand that he is, 
in fact, silently proposing a kind of evolutionary trajectory not unlike Lévy-Bruhl’s original 
trajectory from primitivism (as represented by non-Europeans) to modernity (as represented by 
scientists).  Schütz takes history away from the evolutionary framework and transforms it into a 
synchronic map of the diversity between different modes of approaching the social: one level 
rational, others less and less so.  He gives an example of the difference between the 
cartographer’s and the common man’s perspective on a city, where the latter is centred on 
“home” but the former is interested in the city “only for the purposes of drawing a map” (ibid.: 
132). Between the two extremes, he places the foreigner (like himself, recently arrived in 
Manhattan), who is blessed with the capacity for experiencing the city’s strangeness but does not 
formulate it in neutral, purely unengaged, rational formulations.   
Schütz’s proposal of a mentalist interpretation of conceptual vagueness remains 
atomistic, both in that he naturalises the individuality of the knower and in that he merely shifts 
the focus of concept-constitution from the boundaries of the concept (which are now seen as 
permeable and unclear) to the nucleus of the concept (as he calls it, the “unmodified meaning”): 
“the concept of rationality has its native place not at the level of the every-day conception of the 
social world, but at the theoretical level of the scientific observation of it, and it is here that it 
finds its field of methodological application.” (ibid.: 143) Note how, for him, what is at stake in 
vagueness is not, like for James, to do with a feature of the world nor, like for Lévy-Bruhl, 
concerning the unitariness of the person, but rather an “every-day conception of the social world.”  
In this way, Schütz manages to graft the evidence of vagueness onto the atomistic 
conception of personhood that was the order of the day at the end of the Second World War.  
He does not differ from Parsons in regard to this individualism,3 only in the latter’s 
interpretation of how concepts are constituted (e.g. see 1943: 135).  In other words, Schütz takes 
participation out of vagueness, so to speak.   But, in James’ account, vagueness had been a 
feature of the world at large, not only of our ideas of it.  The intellectual efforts of both James 
and Lévy-Bruhl went much further than a mere consideration of the nature of concept 
formation: for them, vagueness revealed to us that participation constantly challenges boundary 
setting, and participation that the singularity of entities is always challenged by vagueness.   
Closed in his individualistic and mentalistic conception of social interaction as based on 
concepts that do not correspond to reality (as reality would be precise and concepts imprecise), 
Schütz proposes that what the social sciences do is create imaginary figures that are closed off 
from the world.  He interprets James’s metaphysical pluralism (“his profound theory of the 
different realities that we live in at the same time”, 1943: 149) in a relativist manner.  So Weber’s 
ideal types become “puppets”: “the scientist replaces the human beings he observes as actors on 
the social stage by puppets created by himself and manipulated by himself.” (ibid.: 143)  In short, 
he concludes that he does not “really know what reality is” (ibid.: 149) but, even although “the 
world of both the natural and the social scientist is neither more or less real than the world of 
thought in general” (idem), science is at least useful: it is “performed within a certain means-ends 
relation, namely, in order to acquire knowledge for mastering the world, the real world, not the 
one created by the grace of the scientist.” (ibid.: 148) 
Schütz’s 1943 essay was going to be very influential in subsequent sociological debates.  
However, the more famous example of its influence reads today almost like a caricature.  I have 
in mind Harold Garfinkel’s essay on “The rational properties of scientific and common sense 
activities” (1962: 262-283). Inspired in Schütz’s original classification, Garfinkel proposes a list of 
14 forms of conduct that may be considered rational—he calls them “the rationalities” (ibid.: 
264).  He puts these to an empirical test and he concludes that of the original 14 only 4 
constituted “scientific rationalities”: “compatibility of ends-means relationship with formal 
 
3 In this regard, I call the reader’s attention to Keith Tribe’s interesting essay on Parsons’ problematic translations of 
Weber and, in particular, to a comparison between Parsons’ translation of Weber’s text and a contemporary 
translation: where Weber refers to “actor or actors”, Parsons says “the acting individual”, thus implicitly naturalizing 
the person (Tribe 2007: 232) 
logic”; “semantic clarity and distinctness”; “clarity and distinctness ‘for its own sake’”; and 
“compatibility of the definition of a situation with scientific knowledge” (ibid.: 267-8). When 
Garfinkel asked his student-researchers to introduce the “scientific rationalities” into 
experimental everyday encounters, the results were so disturbing both for the students and for 
the subjects that they had to be discontinued.  Garfinkel concludes: “the scientific rationalities, in 
fact, occur as stable properties of actions and as sanctionable ideals only in the case of actions 
governed by the attitude of scientific theorizing. By contrast, actions governed by the attitude of 
daily life are marked by the specific absence of these rationalities either as stable properties or as 
sanctionable ideals.” (ibid.: 270)   
Garfinkel’s conclusion to his paper, therefore, is fittingly nihilistic: a person’s behavioural 
environment is “senseless” and their system of interaction presents “disorganized features” 
(ibid.: 283).  The whole exercise can be seen as a caricature of what can happen when one 
attempts to integrate vagueness into social analysis as a purely semantic feature, without taking 
into account its fuller metaphysical implications.  Garfinkel’s account, together with Schütz’ 
before him, silently naturalised both an atomistic conception of persons as individuals and a 
mentalist conception of social cognition as separated from the world.   
To the contrary, both James and Lévy-Bruhl had shown that to naturalise individual 
minds is to close oneself within a vicious circle of representation-presentation.  Their concern 
with the nature of the knower in the world allowed them to see that singularity always emerges 
relationally—always incompletely, permeably, dividedly, partibly. In conclusion, the lesson we 
take from contrasting these two moments in sociological theorising is that we should adopt a 
conception of the way in which entities come to behave as entities in sociality where vagueness is 
the way to describe emergence from the angle of having emerged, and participation from the angle 
of coming to emergence.   
No emergence (be it of a person or of an organism) is a clean-off launch—like a rocket 
that is freed from the world’s atmosphere into the stratosphere never to return again.  Rather, all 
emergence is a launch within—like a satellite that circles the earth, being tied in orbit by the 
earth’s pull.  This means that leakage between entities is inevitable, both as vagueness in terms of 
determination of limits, and as participation in terms of superposition with the other entities that 
surround it. That is, the emergence of an entity—be it a person or an organism—involves a 
relation of entanglement between the parts that come together and the whole: the parts interact 
with the whole.  As Karen Barad explains, “To be entangled is not simply to be intertwined with 
another, as in the joining of separate entities, but to lack an independent, self-contained 
existence.” (2007: ix) In the next section, we will attempt to give body to these ideas by means of 
recent ethnographic evidence. 
 
Leakage 
Behind the individualistic and mentalist consensus that mostly characterised the second half of 
the past century, the problems with rationality that the earlier thinkers had identified never 
completely vanished (see Pina-Cabral 2018a). In anthropology, Needham’s Belief, Language and 
Experience (1972), was perhaps the first major sign of the disquiet concerning the mid-century 
atomistic orthodoxy.  But Ardener’s poststructuralist essays of the same period (e.g. 2007) are 
also equally prophetic in their attempt to break epistemological barriers. In the early 2000s, as the 
mindset characteristic of Parsonian thinking started to fade in the face of poststructuralist 
critique, the insights implicit in the discussion on participation were again brought to the fore, 
both in the anthropology of kinship (Sahlins 2011a and 2011b, Pina-Cabral 2018b crossroads) 
and in the interaction between biology and anthropology—namely in the work of 
phenomenologically inspired philosophers such as Shaun Gallagher (e.g. 2007) or Evan 
Thompson (e.g. 2007) and, more broadly, in Radical Embodied Cognition (e.g. Chemero 2009, 
Hutto and Myin 2013).  In this way, participation presents itself as a universal disposition of 
humans, being constitutive of persons (see Pina-Cabral 2016), metapersons (see Pina-Cabral 
2019), and supra-personal entities (that is, broadly speaking, institutions—see Pina-Cabral 2011).   
The new material that has been emerging out of feminist inspired ethnography—e.g. 
Strathern (2004), Haraway (1989) or Barad (2007)—encourages us to see that, whilst the focus 
on personal ontogeny remains central to any anthropological discussion (see Toren 2012), it is 
advisable to move beyond an anthropocentric perspective in considering how limits operate in 
the emergence of entities (not only between persons but between persons and other entities in 
the world—see Ingold 2010).  As Mauss had argued in his essay on the gift, “the law of things 
remains bound up with the law of persons” (1967 [1923]: 2).  So, we must agree with Strathern’s 
injunction that, if we take to heart Mauss’s discovery that the thing given is personified, then we 
must realise that persons are also aspects of things (1984).  James’ concept of vagueness, in that 
it applies both to forms of life and to life forms (Helmreich), becomes a window into this 
complex process, helping us to break radically from the dichotomic injunctions of semiotic 
thinking, that separates form from substance, representation from presentation, mind from 
body, signifier from signified.  It is precisely this aspect that contemporary ethnographic 
evidence is urgently asking us to reconsider. 
In Emilia Sanabria’s ethnography of the role of sex hormones in menstrual suppression 
in Bahia (NE Brazil) in the mid 2010s (2016), the ethnographer explores what she calls the 
“leakages” between and among entities and substances—both persons and other aspects of the 
world.  As she puts it, “as sex hormones circulate globally, they leak between official and 
unofficial prescription regimes, reconfiguring bodies and socialities by circulating not only 
through blood, brain, and other body sites but also through social settings.” (2016: 19) This 
circulation of substances is a challenge to the limits that demarcate entities, calling our attention 
to how the emergence of live entities in the world (both persons and others) is always 
accompanied by ontological transgression (Palmié 2018).   If this kind of “leakage” is inescapable it is 
only because it is also a condition of emergence. 
A limit (or border) is the point at which an entity uncouples from the earlier moorings of 
its parts, the point at which it shades or snaps into something else. Limits must be constantly 
enacted because, whilst limits draw out the essences of entities, the ground upon which an entity 
arises never vanishes, as it is its very condition of existence. In Word: An anthropological 
examination, taking recourse to the example set by Saint Anselm’s Ontological Proof, I argued at 
length why an entity’s beingness can never be dissociated from its occurrence (2017: 54-5).  As 
Helmreich has put it, “life forms and forms of life not only inform one another (especially after 
biopolitics) but the two may be impossible to disentangle.” (2011: 693) 
Hormone use in contemporary situations provides us with an excellent case study of this 
form of ontological transgression.  Yet hormones are not only used by persons who want to 
affect their own bodies (as in medical use for menstrual suppression or for sex change); they 
were always in operation as they circulated in people’s bodies, even before they were 
pharmacologically identified and synthetically manipulated. But the fact is hormones “leak back”, 
as it were: they are also encountered in the environment affecting people’s bodies and their 
mutual relations. This happens now in that hormones have been pharmacologically freed from 
their former contexts of occurrence, but it has always happened in that hormonally mobilised 
communications (namely through smell) have always been a feature of life.   
The impact of hormones, however, goes way beyond communication between 
organisms. For example, one morning, in the coastal mangrove of Baixo Sul (Bahia, Brazil), 
where I was carrying out fieldwork, all of the crabs died and emerged floating to the calm waters 
of the mangrove (see Pina-Cabral 2012).  It was claimed by the local NGOs interested in 
environmental protection that this happened because the dike of one of the shrimp breeding 
plants to the north of the town of Valença had breached and the chemically polluted water 
spread throughout the mangrove’s waterways killing the crabs.   As crabs died, the economic 
situation of the fishermen whom I was studying at the time was severely affected (Pina-Cabral 
and Silva 2013).  For a person on the margin of indigence, such as this fishing folk living in 
State-owned mangrove forests, a sudden reduction in their expected mode of subsistence affects 
their very capacity to support their families, pushing them to engage in salaried work in the 
towns, a form of work that they perceive as a kind of captivity because it demeans them and 
takes them away from their families.  
Hormones, therefore, in one kind of circulation, are a bridge between sex and gender, 
where the two leak into each other; but, at the same time, in another area of circulation, they are 
also a bridge between personhood and environment, namely in the way in which medical 
hormone consumption ends up in the environment through the sewage system and is then 
found to affect profoundly humans and the animals they consume: “As sex hormones circulate 
globally they leak between official and unofficial prescription regimes, reconfiguring bodies and 
socialities by circulating not only through blood, brain, and other body sites but also through 
social settings.” (Sanabria 2016: 19)  Such situations provide us with an excellent example of how 
leakage is transgressive in that it does not only affect who people are by relation to each other, 
but also who they become by living in a world were substances circulate. James’ “ontological 
wonder-sickness” at the fact that vagueness is out there in the world, cannot fail to impact us 
today.   
In this way, vagueness is an integral aspect of the circulation of substances more broadly, 
both between persons and between live beings and the rest of the world.  Social science 
discourse, however, is prone to emphasise the first aspect at the expense of the second.  Yet, for 
example, when we agree with Shaun Gallagher’s observation that “Our attention to objects 
changes when others are present” (2009: 302), we are at risk both of emphasising unduly 
cognitive aspects at the expense of action, and of being anthropocentric in naturalising the 
background scene of an adult person in conscious cognition.  This is a problem because we have 
come to find that perception itself “alters its meaning as a result of social coordination” (De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007: 16, fn2). Vagueness and participation combine in that they are both 
aspects of participatory sense-making, that is, “the coordination of intentional activity in interaction, 
whereby individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains of social sense-making 
can be generated that were not available to each individual on her own.” (ibid.: 8). Perception, as 
participatory sense-making, is not only mentalistic (as representation), it is out there in the 
interaction between persons (in their singularity, their plurality and their multiplicity) and the 
world.  In conclusion, we must not revert to a subject-object dichotomy: whilst our response to a 
person is different from our response to an animal, a plant or a stone, the fact is that there is 
emergence, participation and vagueness in the world beyond humans. 
Sanabria’s take on leakage is inspired by the earlier work of Anne M. Lovell on the use of 
synthetic opiates in France in the late 1990s.  HDB (buprenorphine) was being used in France 
for the treatment of problematic opiate-use, namely heroine addiction, and had become a major 
source of revenue to legal pharmaceutical firms, that received considerable government subsidies 
for developing it.  At the same time, in South Asia, HDB was being used as a regular drug of 
addiction.  Lovell observes that 
These two global addiction markets are joined through the process of pharmaceutical leakage, the 
movement of an addiction pharmaceutical from the site that legitimizes it (the treatment context, 
in which its commodity status is downplayed before its status as a pharmaceutical or a medicine 
[…]) to an informal, illicit network (the drug economy, where it morphs into a symbolically 
charged ‘dirty’ commodity that escapes market and state regulatory mechanism).  […] 
pharmaceutical leakage and diversion mark the secret life of addiction pharmaceuticals. (2006: 
138) 
HDB, as it was being used in France then, provides us with a useful example of how a 
single substance turns out to have two lives—it leaks from one sector to another, from licit to 
illicit use (2006: 156)—and, as it leaks between contexts of use, it becomes a different substance, 
in that it provides different experiences to different people in different circumstances.   
In her ethnographic monograph on regimes of menstrual suppression in Bahia, Sanabria 
carries these ideas one step further by showing how sex hormones function as affordances, 
becoming constitutive of fields beyond their original settings (2016: 188).  In her ethnography, 
she follows these substances across their trajectories of “medical nomadism” (ibid.: 156). 
Hormones affect sex according to gender identities and affect gender by providing new sexual 
affordances.  In the process, much in the same way that hormones in the waters of the 
mangroves were forcing fishermen to engage in oppressive work regimes, so in the case of 
menstrual suppression, hormones were part of a change in modes of body management by 
relation to work and sexual availability both for middle-class and for lower class women, but in 
different ways.  The leakage is between regimes of use of objects.  But, as these objects become 
part of people, they revert to their condition as “things”—that is, they come to participate 
intimately in the persons at stake.  In this way, they constitute margins of vagueness making 
transformation possible. 
In sum, when we conjoin participation with vagueness, we are not only dealing with the 
nature of the emergence of entities but with the fact that worlding is a process of emergence. 
Long ago, in his time-setting essay concerning the circulation of substances as a background to 
Indian cosmovisions, McKim Marriott taught us that leakage is what happens when substances 
circulate between dividual entities (1976).  Entities participate due to the leakage of the 
substances that constitute them.  But the process of leakage is part of the entanglement out of 
which entities emerge—they emerge in a process of singularisation that always remains, we have 
come to learn, incomplete, that is, vague.  At different scales, this applies both to the emergence 
of a person, when it comes to self-reflexion through the use of language, and to the emergence 
of an organism, when it comes to constitute its boundaries by relation to its biological 
environment. Emergence, therefore, can never involve a radical launch off from its launch pad, 
as it were, since emergence occurs from within entanglement—that is, through a process in 
which the parts come to interact with the whole. As such, emergence can never be rid of leakage, 
because the entity’s very existence as an entity is dependent on the background upon which it 
arose.   
From the perspective of the entity that is coming to emerge, leakage presents itself as 
participation.  At the end of his life, Lévy-Bruhl came to see this, when he finally observed that 
participation is not something that happens to persons that are already constituted, since they 
would not have been constituted at all without participation. 
Participation is not simply a mysterious and inexplicable fusion between beings who lose and 
keep at the same time their identity. It enters into the constitution of these same beings. Without 
participation they would not have been a given of their own experience: they would not have 
existed. […] Participation, therefore, is immanent to the individual as he owes what he is to it. 
(1998: 250) 
Yet, on the other hand, from the perspective of the already constituted entity, leakage 
presents itself as vagueness, that is, as an incapacity to determine fully the entity’s boundaries.  
Thus, leakage too is double: on the one hand, part of one body goes into another; on the other 
hand, there is a feedback effect by means of which the part interacts with the whole.  This kind 
of “leakage” as such studies call it, deserves our attention here because it helps us overcome the 
mentalistic and atomistic dispositions that remain to this day as background assumptions to 
social scientific debate and that so hindered the mid-century understanding of James’ argument 
by people like Schütz and Garfinkel. 
Today, therefore, we are encouraged to move beyond the assumed atomistic reduction 
and to work fully with entanglement, that is, the notion that “entities do not pre-exist their 
involvement”, that they emerge through relationality (Kirby 2011: 76).4  To do this, however, 
involves necessarily engaging both in transdisciplinarity and in some level of idiosyncrasy—a 
transgression for which both James and Lévy-Bruhl paid dearly.  Whilst both of these 
dispositions are normally highly praised, they are very seldom actually encouraged by those who 
police scientific fashion.  
 
Doors of entanglement 
Ambiguity in communication cannot be the only mode of vagueness in social life, for if it were, 
we would be closed within a semiotic circle, and we would turn “the origin of social facts” into a 
source of mystery—a divine or societal fiat.  Durkheim’s initial concept of ‘collective 
representations’ was precisely aimed at bridging that paradox.  However, once we abandoned a 
representationist psychology, the bridge he erected crumbled underneath our feet (see Pina-
Cabral 2017).  Sociological approaches inspired by Schütz, based on a notion of the “essential 
ambiguity of the social”, turned out to be insufficient.  Bourdieu’s formulation of habitus does 
help us to some extent travelling along this road, but it too is insufficient—as Green himself 
acknowledges, “habitus is too heavily loaded with objectivist meaning” (2019: 129).  In line with 
what contemporary (non-primitivist) ethnography so clearly reveals, we must move to a model 
of personal ontogeny that is not atomistic and that roots all human thought in the processes of 
constitution of the organism-person (see Ingold 1991).   
Meaning (in the sense of sense-making) is a process that occurs to singular organisms but 
that connects each one of them to a social existence that precedes that organism. Over the past 
decades, studies of cognition have revealed that humans engage essentially in two kinds of sense-
making: “basic mind,” associated to primary intersubjectivity, is intentional and is shared with 
other species (see Hutto and Myin 2013); and “scaffolded mind”, which is associated to 
secondary intersubjectivity (see Trevarthen 1998), is propositional and dependent on language 
use.  The latter arises from within the former in early personal ontogeny and never moves 
beyond the constitutive ground of intersubjectivity (see Toren 2012).  In any case, the theory that 
meaning is normative and that it is, therefore, not open to naturalist explanation does not stand 
up to serious scrutiny (see Anandi Hattiangadi’s convincing demonstration, 2006).  
 
4 The main idea that Karen Barad attempts to capture with her concept of “intra-action”: “The neologism ‘intra-
action’ signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies. That is, in contrast to the usual ‘interaction,’ which 
assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action 
recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. It is important to 
note that the ‘distinct’ agencies are only distinct in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only 
distinct in relation to their mutual entanglement; they don't exist as individual elements.” (Barad 2007: 33) 
James’s vagueness challenges us beyond the mere level of meaning, therefore, since it is 
anterior to meaning—it lies in the very process of emergence of the bearers of meaning (persons 
as well as all other live entities).  All social acts of communication are acts and, to that extent, 
they have to be seen as gestures engaged by the communicator in interaction with the world—
there is no knowledge that dispenses of the knower. This means that we have to account for the 
emergence of the thinker within sociality—that is, the emergence of entities that are both 
singular and collective, which leads us back to participation as a condition of being. Vagueness 
remains paradoxical for so long as it is kept distinct from participation. 
An ethnographic theory that aims to be post-primitivist, must account for how entities 
arise in human sociality within entanglement and never beyond it (see Kirby 2011).  In this 
regard, time, space and matter have to be seen as aspects of sociality, not as essential conditions 
of the world—this would seem to be the lesson to take from Barad’s reading of Bohr’s theories 
of quantum mechanics (2007).  This paper argues that, once we mobilize vagueness and 
participation together as conditions of human experience, we can outline two “doors of 
entanglement”.   
The first is the door of indeterminacy: vagueness is the condition of that which always 
remains indeterminate—its boundaries unclear, its entanglement with the environing world 
never ultimately resolved or severed, and its causes always either insufficient or excessive.  I take 
recourse here to Davidson’s notion of “interpretive charity” (2001) which grounds human 
communication not on the sharing of equal items of meaning, but on the best approximation of 
ultimately indeterminate acts of sense-making.  I have developed this argument at length 
elsewhere (Pina-Cabral 2013 and 2017).  The important aspect here is that meaning is not only 
indeterminate between persons, who understand each other always approximately. But it is also 
indeterminate within each one of us.  Each one of us has become a person in ontogeny to the 
extent that we have transcended our own condition and achieved, through language, 
propositional thinking. The kind of secondary intersubjectivity that characterizes adult humans is 
dependent on personal transcendence and can only be achieved in company.  This means that 
indeterminacy is as much a condition of interpersonal communication as it is of intrapersonal 
cogitation.  As ethnographic practitioners, we should learn to avoid all-or-nothing arguments and 
we should focus on borders as constitutive (as, in fact, Barth demonstrated so long ago, 1969). 
However, the matter cannot be exhausted in this way, as the example of hormone 
leakage so clearly highlighted.  Vagueness, both in the sense of permeability of borders and of 
ultimate indeterminacy of causation, is a characteristic of life in general and perhaps even, if we 
are to trust quantum mechanics, of the cosmos as a whole (see Wendt 2015 and Kirby).  
Vagueness, therefore, is the very condition of the means-ends approximation that defines 
rational action in the world.  Human action in the world is always characterised by stochastic 
forms of dynamic encounter, as Gregory Bateson insisted so long ago (Bateson 1979: 245). To 
simplify, sociality is anterior to communication because each communicating entity only exists to 
the extent that an other created it.  The communicating entity emerges from within the process of 
communication through processes of triangulation—emergence interacts with its background of 
constitution, it does not cancel it out.  In that sense, ‘charity’ is not a choice but a condition. 
Ethics—that is, the experience of being bound by co-responsibility with the entities that 
surround us—is the very motor of interpretive charity that allows for live beings to communicate 
and to interact teleologically with the world (Pina-Cabral 2020).   
The second is the door of underdetermination. Again, much like vagueness, when 
participation was initially identified as a feature of human sociality, it presented itself as 
paradoxical.  From within an atomistic worldview, when Lévy-Bruhl first hit on the evidence of 
its occurrence, it promised to breach the boundaries of entities.  Thus, at first, participation 
seemed to be inimical to rationality.  This is the aporia that drove Lévy-Bruhl’s lifelong enquiry, 
but it also challenged Evans-Pritchard when he wrote his Azande ethnography, and equally 
fascinated Husserl as he formulated his phenomenology. However, if approached in parallel with 
vagueness as an aspect of metaphysical pluralism, participation need no longer challenge 
rationality.  Rather, it can be seen as describing the mode of emergence of live entities from 
within entanglement.  On the one hand, it describes the observation that humans are always to 
some extent superimposed on other humans and on other aspects of the world; but, on the 
other hand, it reveals how, once achieved, the singularity of an entity is never completely 
reducible. 
Participation accounts for the intrinsic fuzziness of the modes of constitution of the 
social. In sociality, emergence occurs stochastically by the delineation of ever-approximate scales 
(see Bateson 1979: 245, or Pina-Cabral 2017: 81-95), but it never comes to absolute completion 
because it never dispenses with its ground of emergence.  The very constitution of live entities 
depends on a kind of scalar interaction “between wholes and the types of things that are its 
constituents.” (Jagdish Hattiangadi 2005: 85)  In the case of persons too, scalar approximation 
reimposes itself all the time, since the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ are permutable and interact at different 
scales (see Strathern 1988: 13-14 and Pina-Cabral 2017a: 112). Participation, therefore, is not 
only characteristic of human interactions but it is inherent in all the operations of all live 
beings—it is a feature of intentionality. Participation is an aspect of all live entities to the extent 
that the processes of mirroring that characterize life as a form of stasis are always incomplete, 
since entropy can never be completely eradicated from life (see Pross 2012). 
As Jagdish Hattiangadi put it, “Beings are merely stable things, and since things can be 
stable at different levels of organization and still interact with other levels, all of them are equally 
real, and none is primary in a metaphysical or atemporal sense.” (2005: 98)  Live entities are non-
wellfounded sets, where the parts interact with the whole (Moss 2014). In other words, the 
process of emergence involves a dynamic where scale shifting combines with symmetry in order 
to constitute singularities (that is, durable states, entities) that, to the extent that they are 
bounded, are self-referential. This suggests that time has come for us to revisit anthropology’s 
rich heritage of structural methods of analysis.  By giving up on atomism, we can start work 
again on a mitigated (underdetermined) form of structuralist analysis.   
Finally, if we prolong our metaphor a little, these two doors of entanglement appear as 
swing doors, to the extent that they allow movement in both directions.  In the terms of 
indeterminacy, vagueness and participation are limitative in that they permit of no absolute 
determination: entities will ever have fuzzy boundaries and will ever co-exist in superimposition. 
In terms of underdetermination, however, vagueness and participation are revealed to be 
constitutive in that they are conditions for the emergence of entities whose singularity, in that it 
is emergent, always remains underdetermined. 
 
Conclusion  
To conclude, if the above claims are valid, William James’ insight has not only been fully 
vindicated but it allows us to move significantly beyond the terms of his own position, without 
for all that having to invalidate it.  The world of humans is foundationally vague both in that it is 
indeterminate and in that it is underdetermined; and it remains so to the end.  Logical, conscious, 
propositional thinking guided by Aristotle’s laws of contradiction is not the ultimate seat of 
thought, as Lévy-Bruhl came to understand at the end of his life (see Pina-Cabral 2018a).  We 
must cast off that modernist myth, as we had to cast off so many others.  Rather, logical thought 
is one among other ways of engaging the world and, at best, it is a technically limited condition 
that cannot in any way account for anyone’s thinking—not even the thinking of those who, like 
me at this moment, struggle to ‘make sense’ and, all too often, are only capable of doing so in 
limited ways.  
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